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Abstract

Cognitive and behavioral biases, which are widespread among humans, have recently
been demonstrated in other primates, suggesting a common origin. Here we examine whether
the expression of one shared bias, the endowment effect, varies as a function of context. We
tested whether objects lacking inherent value elicited a stronger endowment effect (or preference
for keeping the object) in a context in which the objects had immediate instrumental value for
obtaining valuable resources (food). Chimpanzee subjects had opportunities to trade tools when
food was not present, visible but unobtainable, and obtainable using the tools. We found that the
endowment effect for these tools existed only when they were useful, showing that the effect
varies as a function of context-specific utility. Such context-specific variation suggests that the
variation seen in some human biases may trace predictably to behaviors that evolved to
maximize gains in specific circumstances.
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Introduction

Cognitive and behavioral biases are widespread among humans. For example: we change
our preferences as a function of how choices are framed; we overly discount the future; we fear a
loss more than a missed opportunity for equivalent gain; and we ascribe markedly different
values to the same item, depending on whether or not we own it (Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O'Donoghue, 2002; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991a, 1991b). Such biases are important to
study, as they affect decision-making and render modeling behavior based on the common
assumption of rationality quite difficult. Although the roots of these biases are unknown, one
possibility is that they are based on evolved tendencies. If this is the case, then these biases may
be explicable and predictable, reflecting previously unrecognized patterns (Gigerenzer, 2000;
Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; Haselton, et al., 2009; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Jones, 2001;
Jones & Goldsmith, 2005; see also McKay & Efferson, 2010, for a discussion of the difference
between cognitive and behavioral biases, and when that distinction can matter. For our purposes
here, the distinction is immaterial.).

There is growing evidence that this is the case. Recent discoveries of such biases in other
primates, including the endowment effect (Brosnan, et al., 2007), loss aversion (Chen,
Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006), and intergroup bias (Mahajan, et al., 2011), suggest that
some biases persist because of the benefits they once provided (Jones, 2001; Jones & Brosnan,
2008). For instance, capuchin monkeys making decisions in a scenario reminiscent of the Asian
Disease problem show behavior very much like that of humans, preferring to minimize risk in
the context of loss, but preferring the opposite pattern in the context of gains. Although Chen et
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al’s (2006) study did not investigate this, the response is unlikely to be due to a simple aversion
to ambiguity, as chimpanzees and bonobos are able to distinguish risk and ambiguity (Rosati &
Hare, 2010). These are a particularly relevant biases, as loss aversion and the endowment effect
are presumably linked (Kahneman, et al., 1991b).

The exchange-based endowment effect provides a ready lens to test the adaptation
hypothesis, both because it has been documented widely, including in other species, and because
it is not language based, opening up myriad experimental possibilities, including comparative
studies. The endowment effect is the phenomenon by which individuals immediately begin to
value what they have just come to possess much more than they valued the same item prior to the
moment of possession (Franciosi, Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, & Deng, 1996; Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Kahneman, et al., 1991b). The phenomenon is wide-spread in humans
and is seen in other primates that have been tested, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and
capuchin monkeys (Brosnan, et al., 2007; Flemming, Jones, Stoinski, Mayo, & Brosnan, in
review; Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008) .

The underlying causes of this bias are widely debated in the human literature. For
example, as Korobkin explained (2003), some scholars speculate that the effect arises from
uncontrolled artifacts of the experimental setting, such as strategic bargaining or unintended, but
perceived, signals within the experimental manipulation. Others question whether the effect is
caused by the role of personal wealth in valuation processes (such as wealth effects or constraints
on liquid resources). Many believe the effect is a manifestation of “loss aversion” (and its
cousins attachment, regret avoidance, and the disutilities of selling; Camerer, 2005). Still others,
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attempting formal models, argue that buying scenarios create significantly different expectations
and reference points than selling scenarios, and that these differences are the root cause of the
observed changes in behavior (Koszegi & Rabin, 2006). Plott and Zeiler are among the most
vigorous critics of the idea that the observed disjunctions between maximum buying and
minimum selling prices (which they argue can be altered by subtle changes in experimental
conditions) are in fact related to “endowment” at all (Plott & Zeiler, 2007; Plott & Zeiler, 2005).
And, as many have observed (e.g., Jones & Brosnan, 2008; Korobkin, 2003), there is far closer
consensus on the existence of an effect than there is on its underlying causes.

One of the critical drivers of this controversy about causes -- within economics,
behavioral economics, psychology, and law -- is the widespread and seemingly unpredictable
variation in the effect (Sayman & Onculer, 2005). But if the bias results from evolutionary
processes, as the primate studies suggest, rather than simply vagaries of experimental design,
then there should be some underlying consistency with respect to the situations in which the
effect emerges and when it does not. If this is the case, then an understanding of the underlying
causes of this variation could illuminate previously hidden patterns in the human decisionmaking architecture – not only with respect to the endowment effect, but also with respect to the
entire suite of biases.

It is one of these underlying causes that we investigate here. One important feature of the
endowment effect is that it appears in the context of exchange. Such interactions are inherently
risky, as a willingness to exchange one item for a preferred item possessed by a seemingly
willing exchange partner could instead result, through defection of the exchange partner, in the

5

loss of both items. Thus, one reasonable hypothesis is that the effect should be greater in
contexts in which the risk of a partner’s defection is higher. This risk depends not only on the
relationship between partners, but also on the value of the object. Possessors may be unlikely to
give up a particularly valuable object, raising the risk of defection. However, while these results
do not test this, it seems unlikely that this was an issue given our procedure, in which
experimenters reliably exchanged. In addition, and what we examine in the current study, is the
value to the individual making the decision whether to exchange. That is, if there is an
evolutionary basis to this effect, one would expect manifestations of the effect to vary as a
function of immediate usefulness of the object. A specific prediction emerges from this
hypothesis: the effect should vary as a function of the instrumental value, or usefulness, of the
object at issue to the individual making the decision to exchange (which affects the costs actually
incurred from failed exchanges, and, hence, the overall risk).

In fact, previous studies of the endowment effect hint at this possibility. The
aforementioned study on chimpanzees (Brosnan, et al., 2007) was designed to replicate an earlier
study of humans by Knetch (1989), which compared one group’s preferences for a mug versus a
chocolate bar for two other groups’ tendency to exchange when endowed with one and given the
option to exchange for the other. We hypothesized that subjects would treat food and non-food
items differently, given the extreme salience of food to chimpanzees and the relative lack of
interest in non-food objects (e.g. chimpanzees retain few non-food items, including tools, in their
possession over extended periods; (Brosnan, in press). Thus we ran two different versions, one
using familiar preferred foods and one using familiar toys. We found a strong endowment effect,
within the range of human studies, when using foods, but no endowment effect when using non-
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foods. In fact, in the latter case, the subjects vastly preferred to trade, perhaps indicating a
preference for interaction with the human experimenter over the items themselves. Although we
could not rule out confounds such as a general lack of interest in non-foods, the results
nonetheless indicated the possibility that chimpanzees treat food-food exchanges categorically
differently from exchanges of non-foods. Yet that study design did not allow us to test the
subtler possibility that endowment effects in chimpanzees’ might change for the same item (a
non-food) depending on whether the item is situationally useful, for instance, giving the
chimpanzees an immediate ability to obtain food. Thus, the current study was designed to test
the hypothesis that chimpanzees’ behavior would change for the same non-food item, a tool,
depending on whether it could be used to obtain food.

To do this, we followed a similar procedure to test the endowment effect, but did so using
the same pair of (non-food) objects in all conditions. This removed the possibility that an
inherent difference between the objects caused any difference in the subjects’ responses. These
objects were tools that could be used to obtain a specific food (juice or sweetened oatmeal), but
neither of which could be used to obtain the other food. These tool pairs were tested in three
situations: one in which neither food was available or visible (i.e., the tools could not be used to
obtain food), one in which both foods were both visible and available (i.e., the tools were both
useful), and one in which both foods were visible but not reachable. This latter controlled for the
possibility that the very presence of food might change subject preferences, which was
particularly important since the tools are secondary reinforcers that might have been treated
similarly to the foods they could acquire (Breland & Breland, 1961), even when those foods
were not actually accessible.
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This design removed a number of confounds. First, as mentioned previously, the fact that
the same pair of objects was tested in all three cases removed the possibility that some difference
other than the tool’s usefulness affected their responses. Second, the fact that neither tool could
be used to obtain the other food removed the possibility that they would consider one tool ‘good
enough’ for either food and thus be disinclined to exchange. Third, the control situation, in
which foods were visible but not available, allowed us to rule out the possibility that it was the
presence of foods that caused any response, rather than the usefulness of the objects themselves.

Finally, human studies universally utilize between-subjects designs to compare group
level preferences, obscuring any data on individuals’ behavior in such tasks. These data may be
very important; an effect at the group level could be due to a few individual’s preferences rather
than to a consistent response across all members of the group. Thus we used a within-subjects
design, common in primate studies, with each condition tested in counterbalanced order on each
subject. In this way we got a measure of the number of individuals who showed behavior
consistent with an endowment effect. In order to better compare our results to those from human
studies, we also analyzed the change in the groups’ mean behavior between each condition.

Thus, the current study specifically addressed the role of how an object’s immediate
usefulness affected the endowment effect by using exchange items, tools, which varied in
whether they could be immediately used to obtain food, but were otherwise identical between
conditions. We hypothesized that the tool’s situational value would influence the endowment
effect. Specifically, we predicted a stronger endowment effect when tools were useful (i.e.,
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when both foods were available) than when the tools were not useful (either because the food
was absent, or when it was present but not available). Secondarily, we utilized both individualand group-level analyses to best understand the variation within chimpanzees, as well as how
these results compared to those of humans.

Methods

Participants

Participants were 20 adult chimpanzees (10 male, 10 female) housed at the Michale E.
Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research of The University of Texas MD
Anderson Cancer Center. Chimpanzees were housed in social groups in large outdoor enclosures
with climbing structures, toys, and additional enrichment. Each outdoor compound also included
an indoor area of dens, where all testing took place. Subjects received biscuits and water ad
libitum and four daily enrichment meals.

Subjects were already proficient at exchanging objects with a human for a food reward.
This was essential for the task, as subjects who were disinclined to exchange would artificially
inflate the results indicative of an endowment effect. Thus, prior to commencing the study, we
verified that each subject would exchange with the human experimenter. All subjects completed
a session of exchange with the experimenter, in which they were required to return an object 10
times in a row. All subjects passed this pre-test.
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Because the experiment involved tools, it was also important to verify that each
chimpanzee could use each tool equally proficiently. To ensure subjects understood the task and
tools, we chose two ecologically relevant tasks they experienced routinely as part of their regular
enrichment. The first task was a dipping task in which subjects could use a stick to obtain
oatmeal (similar to a honey dipping task) and the second was a sponging task in which subjects
could use paper wads to obtain juice (details of both are below). All subjects received a series of
sessions in which they were given both of the tasks individually, with the appropriate tool, to
verify that they could use the tool to obtain the appropriate food.

Tools

Items for exchange consisted of two tools: a sponge that could be used to obtain juice
(50% grape juice; 50% water) and a dipstick that could be used to obtain oatmeal (instant maple
brown sugar flavor). These foods were chosen because pilot testing using chimpanzees that were
not a part of the study (to avoid differential exposure to the objects prior to testing) showed
similar preferences for the two. The sponge consisted of an approximately 30x40cm piece of
absorbent butcher paper that chimpanzees wadded and dipped into juice available in a trough
outside of their enclosure. The dipstick was a cardboard lollipop stick, approximately 29cm in
length that could be dipped in the hole of the oatmeal container to obtain oatmeal. The oatmeal
container was also located outside of the subjects’ enclosure, and its hole was too small to admit
fingers or any tool other than the provided stick. Neither food could be obtained without the
appropriate tool, or with the alternate tool.
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Procedure

Tests were divided into three Treatments of three tests each. In the first Treatment (the
Absent Treatment), no food was present during any of the four tests. In the second Treatment
(the Unobtainable Treatment), both foods were visible and present, but beyond the chimpanzees’
reach during all four tests. Thus, subjects could clearly see the foods, but were unable to use the
tools to access them. After the completion of the subjects’ session, foods were removed without
the chimpanzees having access to them, so they had no expectation that rewards would be
available at a later time. In the third Treatment (the Obtainable Treatment), both foods were
present and obtainable with the corresponding tool during all tests. Note that in the Unobtainable
and Obtainable Treatments, both foods were always present simultaneously and for the duration
of the test; the difference lay in whether the foods could be accessed. The Absent Treatment
control was run twice, prior to each of the other two Treatments, to verify that the subjects’
behavior toward the tools did not change with the experience provided in the first Treatment.

Each Treatment consisted of a Preference Condition and two Endowment Conditions. In
the Preference Condition, subjects were given a simultaneous choice between the two tools, and
indicated their preference by reaching for their preferred item. Tools were presented on a predetermined side, which was counterbalanced across chimpanzees. The experimenter held both
objects out, approximately 20 cm apart and at eye level to the chimpanzee, and called the
chimpanzee’s attention to them. Once the chimpanzee was watching, the experimenter moved
both objects forward to within 5 cm of the caging. Subjects could indicate their preference by
reaching with their hand or their pursed lips (some subjects had previously been trained to accept
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foods with their lips, and so were allowed to indicate preference however they preferred).
Whichever object they reached for was then given to them (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004).

In the Endowment Conditions, subjects were given a pre-determined tool, then given the
option to keep it or exchange it for another. The experimenter again held both tools out, at the
chimpanzee’s eye level, approximately 20 cm away and called the chimpanzee’s attention to
them. Once the chimpanzee was watching, the experimenter handed the pre-determined tool to
the chimpanzee. The experimenter then offered an exchange immediately (as is typical in human
endowment effect experiments) with the second tool in her right hand (if it was not already there;
object presentation was counterbalanced) and moved it forward to within 5 cm of the caging. At
the same time, the experimenter held her left hand out, palm up, at the chimpanzee’s chest level,
which is always used to request an exchange. The experimenter did not use any words or cues
(e.g. a clicker) that might have indicated that the chimpanzee was expected to exchange.
Subjects had the opportunity to exchange until they used the tool or 30s elapsed, whichever came
first (Brosnan, et al., 2007). In practice, the subject always either exchanged or used the tool
within a few seconds. Thus, for the Dipstick Endowment Condition, subjects were endowed
with the dipstick and could exchange for the sponge; in the Sponge Endowment Condition,
subjects were endowed with the sponge and could exchange for the dipstick. Again, whenever
foods were present (e.g. the Obtainable and Unobtainable Treatments) both foods were available
simultaneously in all three of the Conditions, so subjects had access to both – or neither –
simultaneously.
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Treatments were presented in a set order, but the three conditions were randomized for
each subject within each Treatment. Subjects first completed the Absent Treatment (as an initial
control), followed by the Obtainable Treatment. To verify that obtaining a food did not change
their preferences, subjects were given a second Absent Treatment, followed by the Unobtainable
Treatment; results did not differ between the Absent Treatments (Wilcoxon Signed-ranks Tests:
Preference: T+=6, n=10, p=0.527; Endowed sponge: T+=1, n=3, p=0.564; Endowed dipstick:
T+=0, n=1, p=0.317) so these Treatments were combined for most analyses (exceptions are
indicated).

Each of the 20 subjects completed a series of 12 tests, with each test completed on a
different day. Thus subjects had only a single choice a day. In order to minimize possible
effects of habituation, subjects typically received 2-3 choices per week. Subjects were tested
between 10:30 and 15:30, and no testing occurred prior to the first enrichment feeding of the day
(primate chow and water were available ad libitum). In this way, all subjects had had access to
preferred foods prior to their day’s choice, regardless of when they were tested. Tests consisted
of one session each of the Available and Unobtainable Treatments, each of which consisted of
three Conditions, and two of the Absent Treatments, also consisting of three Conditions, with
one Absent Treatment before each of the other two Treatments.

Individual-level vs Group- level analyses
This methodology was based on a human design. However, one weakness of the human
literature on the endowment effect is that results are virtually always compared across groups
(i.e., a between-subjects design), rather than within individuals (i.e., a within-subjects design).
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For example, while humans are known to maintain possession of objects at higher levels than
expected due to their preferences, those preferences were obtained from a different group of
individuals. Group-level analysis obscures variation and does not allow analysis of individual
trends.

Previous research on 32 chimpanzees indicated that while the group-level effect (i.e., the
group-level change in preference, the typical level of analysis for human studies) was similar to
that seen in humans, there was quite a lot of variation in individuals’ behavior (Brosnan, et al.,
2007). Thus we analyzed the current data in two ways. First, we assessed how many
chimpanzees actually showed an endowment effect. For this, we assessed whether each
individual showed behavior consistent with an endowment effect, retaining possession of tools
despite his or her separately expressed preference, and then analyzed whether the distribution of
individuals with each of the four possible outcomes (see below) differed from chance. To do this,
each chimpanzee was given a score of 1 (exchanged neither tool; the only outcome strongly
indicative of an endowment effect), 2 (exchanged both tools; indicative of a preference for
interaction), 3 (exchanged the preferred tool, while keeping the non-preferred tool; behavior
inconsistent with preferences), or 4 (exchanged the non-preferred tool, while keeping the
preferred tool; behavior consistent with preferences). Although there could in theory be some
behavior reflecting an endowment effect hidden within conditions 3 and 4, the most rigorous test,
which we employed, is to consider as evidence of an endowment effect only those cases in
which individuals refused to exchange both tools. This avoids the possibility of considering
individuals who were potentially disinterested in the task (outcome 3) or were simply following
their preferences, with no influence of possession on the strength of those preferences (outcome
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).

We then did a Friedman’s test to see if there was variation across the group in their behavior.

Considering the data in this way allowed us to more fully quantify what happens at the individual
level. Second, we assessed the percent change in preference between Conditions due to the
Treatments across the entire group of chimpanzees tested. That is, considering the mean
responses, were chimpanzees, on average, more likely to exchange than would be anticipated
based on the mean preference results? While we believe that this latter approach is less
informative, it did allow us to compare these results to those of humans.

Analysis

Since the sample size of chimpanzees was only 20, we used non-parametric statistics for
all analyses. Comparisons across multiple dimensions were done using Friedman’s tests, which
take into account repeated measures, and paired comparisons were done using the Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test. In Wilcoxon tests, reported ns differed from 20 due to ties, which are not
considered in the calculation of the final statistic. Significance was considered to be p<0.05. All
statistical tests were two-tailed.

Results

Effect of Treatments and Conditions on chimpanzees’ exchange behavior

There was a strong effect of Treatment on behavior, with subjects behaving differently in
the Obtainable than in the other two Treatments. Specifically, despite the data from our initial
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preference tests with chimpanzees not used in the study (to avoid contamination) that indicated
similar preferences for the two tools, the experimental subjects preferred the sponge over the
dipstick in all conditions. Nonetheless, the preference was significantly stronger in the
Obtainable Treatment as compared to the other two Treatments (preference for sponge; Absent:
70%, Unobtainable: 70%, Obtainable: 100%; χ22=7.74, p=0.025).

Considering the Endowment Conditions, in both the dipstick-endowed and spongeendowed Conditions, subjects exchanged significantly less often in the Obtainable Condition
than in the Absent and Unobtainable Conditions, indicating a stronger preference to keep
whichever tool they had been given when food was currently available (frequency with which
subjects exchanged the dipstick for the sponge; Absent: 97.5%, Unobtainable: 100%, Obtainable:
55%; Friedman’s test: χ22=25.83, p<0.001; frequency with which the subjects exchanged the
sponge for the dipstick; Absent: 72.5%, Unobtainable: 80%, Obtainable: 15%; χ22=22.81,
p<0.001). In other words, subjects were significantly more likely to exchange the tool for
another when food was not currently accessible. However, if food was available (i.e., the
Obtainable Condition) chimpanzees instead preferred to keep whichever tool they received,
regardless of whether it was the sponge or the dipstick.

How many chimpanzees show the Endowment Effect?

We first examined how individuals behaved. Despite the prevalence of group-based
measures in the human literature (see below for group-based measures in this study, to allow for
comparison with humans’ results), we felt an individual approach was more appropriate

16

approach as it uncovered variation hidden in a group-level analysis as well as opening future
possibilities to study how other factors may interact with the response at the individual (rather
than group) level. In our study, each individual could display one of four behaviors: 1)
exchanged neither tool 2) exchanged both tools; 3) exchanged only the preferred tool, or 4)
exchanged only the non-preferred tool. The firstbehavior is the only one that indicated an
endowment effect.

Individuals’ exchange behavior varied significantly across the different Treatments. In
the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments, in which food was not available, more than 70% of
individuals exchanged both tools, a significantly greater percentage than for any of the other
three possibilities (Absent 1: χ22=9.70, p=0.008; Absent 2: χ22=15.7, p<0.001; Unobtainable:
χ22=19.90, p<0.001, Figure 1). No individual kept both tools (the behavioral option most
consistent with an endowment effect) in either of these Treatments. In contrast, in the
Obtainable Treatment, a third of subjects (33%) showed behavior consistent with an endowment
effect, keeping both objects. Moreover, while only approximately 10% of subjects even kept
their preferred tool in the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments, half of subjects (50%) did so in
the Obtainable Treatment (the sponge was preferred for all subjects; χ22=10.80, p=0.013), which
could potentially indicate a stronger endowment effect in the latter context. Finally, in contrast
to the previous two Treatments, in which 70% of subjects exchanged both items, fewer than 5%
of subjects did so in the Obtainable Treatment.

Thus, when the tools are immediately useful, we found evidence for an endowment effect
in approximately one-third of our subjects, as compared to none in either of the two Treatments
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in which food was not immediately available. In comparison, in previous work we found that
42% of chimpanzees showed evidence of an endowment effect for foods, while < 5% (one
subject) did so for non-useful non-foods (in that case, toys that could not be used to obtain food;
Brosnan, et al., 2007). Thus these results were very consistent when comparing conditions both
within studies as well as across studies. Moreover, we found additional evidence that subjects
were sensitive to the presence or absence of food; in the Obtainable Treatment, most of the rest
of the subjects showed the exchange behavior that is expected based on their preferences, while
the vast majority exchanged in all circumstances in the other two Treatments.

Group-level presence of the Endowment Effect

There are remarkably few human studies of the endowment effect that have reported
individual data (the most definitive meta-analysis of endowment effect studies, Sayman &
Oncluler, 2005, identified only two human studies that reported results from within-subject
designs; this reflects the concern that, in humans, any past experience with a given exchangeable
good could confound a person’s future valuation of that good). Thus, while we considered this
group-level analysis less informative than the previous, individual results, we here report the
results of a group-level analysis based on the subjects’ mean responses, in order to compare these
results to those of humans. For this analysis we compared whether the subjects’ mean responses
differed across the three Treatments, as is typically done in human studies. To do so, we
compared the group-level tendency to keep objects initially given in the Endowment Conditions
to the group-level preferences expressed in the Preference Condition. Again, subjects as a group
behaved very differently in the Obtainable Treatment than in the other two Treatments, in which
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food was not obtainable. Comparing the difference between the Preference and Endowment
Conditions across all three Treatments, we found that subjects were much more likely to keep
each of the tools in the Obtainable Treatment than in the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments
(Friedman’s test, Sponge: χ22=19.6, p<0.001; Dipstick: χ22=16.222, p<0.001).

Specifically, in the Absent Treatments, subjects were significantly less likely than
predicted to keep either tool, based on the group-level behavior in the preference tests. Twice as
many subjects exchanged the sponge in the Endowment Condition as expected based on the
preference test results (Figure 2: 70% vs 27.5%; Wilcoxon signed-rank test Absent 1: T+=3,
N=13, p=0.052; Absent 2: T+=0, N=10, p=0.002) and twelve times as many exchanged the
dipstick as expected (30% vs 2.5%; Absent 1: T+=1, N=14, p=0.001; Absent 2: T+=0, N=15,
p<0.001). Despite the fact that food was present, if unreachable, in the Unobtainable Treatment,
three times as many subjects exchanged the sponge in the Endowment Condition as expected
based on the Preference Condition (70% vs 20%; T+=12, N=14, p=0.008) and all subjects
exchanged the dipstick, despite preferring it to the sponge only 30% of the time in the Preference
Condition (30% vs 0%; T+=0, N=14, p<0.001). Thus, in these two conditions, in which food
could not be accessed, subjects were actually more likely to exchange than their preferences
indicate.

In sharp contrast, in the Obtainable Treatment, subjects showed a reduced tendency to
exchange either object. As opposed to the other two Treatments, chimpanzees kept the dipstick
45% of the time (i.e., exchanged it 55% of the time), despite never choosing it when given the
choice (Preference Condition: 45% vs 0%; T+=0, N=11, p=0.001), and exchanging it every
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single time in the Unobtainable Treatment. These results indicate a strong endowment effect.
Unfortunately, despite our efforts to choose tools of equal value based on pilot testing of nonsubject chimpanzees, subjects used in the experiment showed a strong preference for the sponge.
While this does not preclude an endowment effect, it did lead to a ceiling effect; although
subjects kept the sponge on every single trial in the Obtainable Treatment, the mean was not
significantly higher than in the Preference Condition (100% vs 85%; T+=0, N=3, p=0.083).
Nonetheless, the trend was in the direction of an endowment effect.

Discussion

We found that the endowment effect varies markedly as a function of an object’s
immediate usefulness, a phenomenon that has not been previously demonstrated and may serve
to explain some of the variability in the strength of the effect in both humans and other species.
This bias in chimpanzees changed dramatically depending on whether tools that otherwise lacked
inherent value could be used at the time of possession to obtain food. Specifically, when foods
were either not present at all, or present but unobtainable, subjects manifested no endowment
effect for the tools. However, as predicted, when food was present and available, chimpanzees
showed robust endowment effects for the very same tools; that is, they refused to exchange both
tools, their less preferred as well as their more preferred. Importantly, this bias varied not as a
function of the mere presence of the food, but rather it was entirely contingent on the current
possibility of using the tools to obtain food. These findings support the hypothesis that the
endowment effect is the result of evolutionary pressures to maximize outcomes during inherently
risky exchange interactions. In situations in which there was much to lose, exchange may have
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been too risky, leading to a tendency to hold on to a less preferred object, even when a more
preferred one is offered in exchange.

Thus, our data indicate that the variation seen in the endowment effect is predictable
based on at least one factor: whether the object is useful in the current context. The fact that this
variation is consistent and can be predicted based on features external to the experimental
procedure supports the conclusion that this situational dependence evolved to maximize
outcomes in different situations (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007), and that the context of the
interaction – in this case, the object’s usefulness – is at least as important as the actual act of
possession. Thus, when considering the endowment effect, a specific bias, it may often be just as
important to attend to the situation as it is to attend to the mere state of possession. That is,
endowment may be a piece of the puzzle, but an endowment in a context lacking immediate
usefulness may not evoke the bias.

These data extend previous findings indicating that endowment effects in great apes can
differ as a function of the object at issue, as is true in humans (Brosnan, et al., 2007; Flemming,
et al., in review). Given the potential to trade food items in a similar design to this study, both
chimpanzees and orangutans showed an endowment effect of roughly equivalent magnitude to
that seen in some human studies. As predicted, this was not true for toys. However, those
studies confounded salience with other possibilities, such as categorical differences in interest in
the two types of items. The present study disentangles these possibilities and, more importantly,
shows that the endowment effect can actually shift for the same item dependent upon whether
the item is useful in a given situation. Thus, the present results cannot be explained by
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differences in preference between types of items, but can be explained by changes in item
usefulness as situations change.

As with previous data on chimpanzees, our data also indicate that this effect can be the
result of only a subset of the group displaying the behavior. There are several possibilities for
this individual variation. First, endowment effects are likely to vary in strength between
individuals, based on either (or both) innate predispositions or previous experience. Second,
while we have relative preference data between these two tools for all individuals, it may be that
some individuals had stronger or weaker preferences than others, or that they got differential
enjoyment out of the task. Of course, the most critical point is that these effects appear across
multiple species, including humans (Brosnan, et al., 2007; Flemming, et al., in review;
Lakshminarayanan, et al., 2008). Thus, while it may be that the effect does not appear in all
individuals, or in all situations, this does not contraindicate a selective benefit for the bias. The
fact that a behavior has evolved due to selective pressure does not mean that it must manifest at
every opportunity, nor does the fact that a behavior occasionally may not be beneficial make it
any less likely to evolve. Nonetheless, one very important implication of these findings is the
need for additional research on individual-level endowment effects among humans.

Virtually all studies report group-based differences from between-subjects designs,
precluding any investigation of individuals’ behavior. However, our results indicate that
endowment effects on the magnitude of those seen in humans can be the result of only some
individuals’ behavior. Future research in humans is needed to determine the relative contribution
of individuals. Such studies will also help to clarify how individual factors such as experience,
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culture, personality, etc., affect cognitive biases, necessary steps to effectively address them. For
instance, given that the endowment effect is hypothesized to have evolved in the context of risky
trade situations, an obvious hypothesis is that the strength of the endowment effect in an
individual should correlate with their relative risk sensitivity, with more risk-sensitive
individuals displaying the endowment effect in more situations. Hypotheses such as these cannot
be tested with the current, group-level approach that is common amongst human studies.

These data, in concert with those from the previous studies, indicate that suites of
cognitive and behavioral biases in humans cannot be adequately explained by inevitable
constraints on decision-making (such as limitations on cognitive processing power, processing
time, etc.; Conlisk, 1996) or by any psychological phenomenon limited to humans themselves.
Humans are not the only species to show biases, indicating that these behaviors likely evolved
prior to the human split from other species. This has two implications. First, it is clear that we
can learn about the development and function of biases from studying their prevalence and
distribution in other species. Such a comparative approach provides a broader background, as
well as an opportunity to investigate these behaviors removed from modern human culture.

Second, the widespread presence of endowment effects at least, as well as other
behaviors (e.g., loss aversion), indicates that these are not quirks that require justification, but
instead are robust features that evolved in primates (at a minimum – even amoeba show
‘irrational’ behavior in some contexts; Latty & Beekman, 2010). Such prevalence is unlikely if
these behaviors were not specifically selected due to their beneficial results. In other species, it
is likely very risky to trade an object away, as without a skill such as language it is difficult or
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impossible to police interactions and to eliminate cheaters (Brosnan, in press; Brosnan & Beran,
2009; Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). Humans have used language to
develop extensive control mechanisms (e.g., the system of law enforcement, the court system)
that provide an unprecedented opportunity for an individual to interact with others with less fear
of his or her partner cheating. Thus, while the endowment effect seems illogical and even
detrimental in modern western societies, it was likely essential to earlier humans, as well as other
species. This is not to say that this does not require further investigation. From the broader
perspective, understanding the contexts likely to elicit the endowment effect is important for two
reasons.

First, in humans this bias has far-reaching legal and social implications, because vast
personal and market transactions involve exchanges in, and sales of, goods and rights.
Regulators may assume that goods and rights will ultimately end up in the hands of those who
value them the most (at least when transaction costs are minimal; Coase, 1960), making end
distributions relatively insensitive to initial distributions. But endowment effects can make
goods and rights “sticky” – that is, likely to stay in the hands of those into whose hands they
happen to first get. In such cases, endowment effects can undermine efficient markets and
allocations in goods and rights (Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998; Korobkin, 2003). Second, as
argued earlier (Gigerenzer, et al., 1999; Haselton, et al., 2009; Jones, 2001; Jones & Brosnan,
2008; Jones & Goldsmith, 2005), the ability to use an evolutionary perspective to predict novel,
specific, context-dependent variation in one bias suggests that the same may be true for others as
well. A better appreciation for the evolution of these behavioral predispositions may illuminate
their function (i.e., the reason natural selection favored them), which in turn will help with
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predictions of the situations and contexts in which various biases can – or cannot – be expected
to emerge.
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Figure Captions

Figure 1: Individually, subjects were least likely to keep a tool in the Absent and Unobtainable
Treatments, and never showed an endowment effect (i.e., never kept both items). However, in
the Obtainable Treatment, subjects typically either kept both tools (revealing an endowment
effect) or kept their preferred tool. X-axis labels indicate whether subjects kept or exchanged the
tools.

Figure 2: The percent of subjects who chose to keep the endowed tool (e.g., rather than exchange
for the other tool; Endowment Condition) versus the percent of subjects who chose the tool in a
choice task (Preference Condition). When given the opportunity to exchange, subjects were less
likely to keep a given tool (hatched bars) in the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments, than
indicated by their preference (solid bars). They were equally or more likely to keep a tool in the
Obtainable Treatment (Absent Treatments are combined). SP: Sponge; DS: Dipstick. The Y-axis
indicates the percent of subjects who chose the took in the Preference Condition and the percent
of subjects who retained the tool in the Endowment Condition.
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Figure 1: Prevalence of Endowment Effect
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Figure 2: Magnitude of Endowment Effect
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